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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay makes a proposal that may not be controversial among those
with a particular interest in international law, but may be less accepted among
those primarily interested in tax law: that international social and institutional
structures shape, and are shaped by, historical and contemporary domestic
policy decisions. As a result, to incorporate these lessons, tax scholarship
should turn to fields such as international relations, organizational theory, and
political philosophy to provide a broader framework for understanding the rapid
changes that are taking place in tax policy and politics in the United States and
around the world.
What is clear to those interested in tax law is that our field presents an
increasingly technocratic thicket of special rules, principles, and standards
intended to accomplish goals of varying comprehensibility and coherence.
Many-perhaps most-who study tax law concern themselves with the policy
goals and outcomes of a given system as described and implemented through
these rules, standards, and principles, including legislative, judicial, and
administrative efforts. Some scholars are explicit about their focus on a
particular bounded society; others may be less explicit, but rely equally on the
idea that tax law and tax policy are by their nature products and functions of
people gathered within, and defined by, sovereign states.
•
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Yet it is equally clear that the subjects of taxation-both people and
activities to different degrees-are increasingly free in their movement across
physical boundaries. The four authors presenting this essay count themselves
among a growing number of tax scholars who are becoming increasingly convinced that the international flow of capital, goods, and, to a lesser extent,
people, presents a fundamentally and significantly changing role for legal
systems and institutions that tax scholarship has not confronted as fully as other
fields.' Our aim in this essay, and in collaborating over our working papers at
venues such as the 2007 International Law Weekend (ILW) annual conference
in New York, is to further the emergent dialogue between tax law scholars and
international law scholars about how law and institutions evolve in our
globalized world. Tax scholarship could benefit from the expertise of those
who have focused in depth on how international organizations, transnational
networks, and non-state institutions and actors shape business and investment
activities and their regulation in a world of increasingly diffused interests and
resources. In turn, uncovering the particular ways in which international tax
systems, institutions, and organizations develop uniquely and independently
from those in related fields, such as environmental regulation and international
trade, can contribute to a broader understanding of such organizations and
institutions and how they impact the development of the rule of law in global
society.
To that end, each of us presents below a brief introduction to a line of
inquiry that we suggest could add to the story of how tax law is evolving in the
United States and globally. The common thread of these inquiries is that each
focuses on understanding the structure of what has been described as a "flawed
miracle": the modern international tax regime.2 The existence of such a
regime, assuming it is properly so designated, is a miracle in the sense that,
despite the lack of any explicit multilateral agreement, there appears to be
consensus on at least some fundamental issues of taxation among a fairly large,
and perhaps growing, number of countries.'
1.
See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal 'World Tax Organization'
ThroughNationalResponses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006); Julie Roin,
Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 (No. 7) VA. L. REV. 1753
(1995); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, InternationalTax as InternationalLaw, 57 TAx L. REV. 483 (2004); Nancy
H. Kaufman, Fairnessand the Taxation of InternationalIncome, 29 LAw & POLY INT'L Bus. 145 (1998);
Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in InternationalTaxation, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1335 (2001); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443
(2007); Tsilly Dagan, NationalInterests in the InternationalTax Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363, (1998). This
is, of course, not an exhaustive list.
2.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure ofInternationalTaxation: A ProposalforSimplification,
74 TEx. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
3.
Reuven Avi-Yonah is the principal proponent of the theory that there is an international tax
regime. Avi-Yonah, supra note 2, at 1303. Others, such as David Rosenbloom, are skeptical that the
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But the miracle is flawed because of the failure of states to agree
sufficiently on an increasingly lengthy list of key areas, which has had farreaching and unanticipated effects. In effect, the flaw of the modem miracle is
a series of unrelieved collective action problems among states, each multiplying
the harm of the other, resulting in policies across borders that distort behavior
and decision-making of individuals. Among such problems identified in the
international tax law literature are international tax arbitrage and the increasingly complex matter of tax competition. The cumulative impact of this growing
web of collective action problems is the potential demise of the ability of any
one country, regardless of size, to effectively collect sufficient revenue to
support its public needs. Concurrently, this comes at the very time a growing
inequality of the distribution of social burdens and benefits is being perceived
worldwide. 4
The need for revenue to address this global public goods concern,5 and the
increasing unease about the distributional effects ofregulation in an economically integrated world, require that this web of collective action problems be
addressed and, if possible, overcome. Correspondingly, the conception of the
modem state itself has increasingly become co-extensive with the construct of
citizenship, incorporating ideas about political, social, and economic rights and
obligations to connect peoples with particular governments and the world.
Certainly, no single state can continue as a going concern without raising
revenue, and just as certainly it cannot raise revenue without some plausible
connection to persons and property as revenue sources. Further, states cannot
raise revenue effectively or fairly in the modem international economic regime
without interacting with other states and their citizens, as people, goods,
services, and capital increasingly cross global borders. Thus, international tax
law inexorably intertwines with the broader sovereign authority of the state
itself, including its connections with, and to, its citizenry and the other nations
of the world.
Traditional approaches to international tax scholarship have generally
analyzed the law in terms of pursuing the dual policies of worldwide economic
efficiency and the equitable distribution of the international tax burden. One
striking feature of this traditional approach is that it is both unilateral and
Ameri-centric. To the extent other countries are involved, their taxes are often
collection of international agreements and commonality of particular rules, principles, or standards, can truly
be considered a regime at all. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the
"InternationalTax System," 53 TAx L. REv. 137 (2000).
4.

For example, as measured by an increasing gini co-efficient in an increasing number of

countries. See, UNITED NATIONS UNmIERsrrY, WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY DATABASE, V 2.Ob (2007),

http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/DatabaselenGB/database/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
5.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2000).
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considered only as a cost to be taken into account in applying the above
policies.
Approaching international taxation as an inherently global socio-legal
phenomenon would require a departure from this approach, one in which the
international tax regime is analyzed as the interaction of people, capital,
business, other institutions and states, rather than purely as a cost of global
capital investment. Such an approach would require both a broadening of the
scope of the literature incorporated in the tax law scholarship and a departure
from the traditional baselines for analysis. For example, the literature could
begin to incorporate the lessons from multiple areas of scholarship, including
international relations theory, sovereignty theory, political philosophy, political
economy, and behavioral game theory, so as to begin to understand the
changing pressures on taxation that are emerging as a result of the increasingly
complex relationship between states, markets, and people in the globalized
world.
Each of us has begun to consider the broad outlines of these inquiries, and
presents a particular focus below. 6
11. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX7

Given the critical role of taxation and revenue for national governments,
combined with the high (and continually growing) volume' of cross border
business, disagreement is inevitable over whose tax rules should apply, what
those rules should be and what role each country should play. How are these
international tax disputes resolved? When and under what circumstances are
countries able to reach agreement on these tax-based conflicts? The international tax literature has devoted tremendous resources to considering substan-

6.
Each of the four co-authors served as a main contributor of one of the four Sections of this
Essay, with helpful comments and suggestions from the others. Professor Ring is the principal author of the
Section titled International Relations Theory and International Tax; Professor Christians is the principal
author of the Section titled The Role of Sovereignty in the Development of Tax Law; Professor Dean is the
principal author of the Section titled Political Economy and International Tax; and Professor Rosenzweig is

the principal author of the Section titled Group Dynamics, Game Theory and International Tax.
7.
Professor Ring has discussed these issues in greater depth in prior articles. See, e.g., Diane
Ring, InternationalTax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAx L. REv. 83 (2007) [hereinafter
InternationalTax Relations]; Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of CrossBorder Tax Arbitrage,44 B.C. L. REV. 79 (2002).
8.
The U.S. Treasury Department recently observed that "[tihe United States isincreasingly linked
to the world economy through trade and investment. Capital now flows more freely across the globe.
Businesses start up and operate more freely across borders, and business location and investment decisions
are more sensitive to tax and regulatory structures than in the past." U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY,
TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BusINEss TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETnVENESS, BACKGROUND PAPER 1

(2007).

2008]

Christians,Dean, Ring andRosenzweig

tive issues in international taxation. Little attention, however, has been directed
to how conflict is handled--essentially the "relations" aspect of international
tax. Where can we look for a deeper understanding of these fundamental
concerns?
Cross-border conflict is not confined to the field of taxation; virtually all
social and commercial behavior can generate international disagreement. The
international relations literature is devoted to examining questions of
relationships, roles, conflicts and solutions on an international scale and across
a wide range of substantive topics.9 As international tax increasingly turns its
attention to the impact of state-to-state dynamics, multiple players, ° and
intersecting issues, the analyses and insights from international relations
research will move to the fore. Although it can be daunting to begin the process
of synthesizing such an expansive field of literature, the effort is invaluable and
ultimately essential."
For example, by drawing upon the work in "regime theory"12 from the
international relations field, we can develop models for evaluating when
countries are likely to reach a resolution on a significant issue of tax law or
procedure (i.e. create a "regime"). Even the narrow dimension of the international relations theory literature subsumed under the heading of regime
theory is not monolithic but rather incorporates several different strands and
models. Each model is best understood as applicable to different circumstances
(depending on whether power or other factors such as game theory, type of
issue, and related background features are more salient) and not as competing
for complete analytic superiority. Thus, regime theory analysis provides a new
lens through which to understand one of the central features of the international
tax system-the regime for avoidance of double taxation which is significantly
implemented through income tax treaties.

9.

See, e.g., JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28-34 (5th ed. 2001); ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE:
CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1990); BARRY BUZAN, CHARLES JONES &
RICHARD LITTLE, THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY: NEOREALISM TO STRUCTURAL REALISM (1993).
10.

For a consideration of nonstate actors on the global stage, see, e.g., DOUGHERTY &

PFALTZGRAFF, JR., supra note 9, at 28-34; Peter Willetts, Transnational Actors and International
Organizationsin Global Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 287,288,292-303 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997).

11.

See InternationalTax Relations, supra note 7.

12.

ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER& VOLKERRITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 8-11 (1997); REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer
eds., 1993). This use of the term "regime" from international relations theory is narrower and more precise

than the general usage seen, for example, in characterizing the international tax system as an "international
tax regime." See supra notes 1-2.
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The effort to interpret the past ninety years of double taxation policy and
practice through the framework of regime theory encourages us to:
1) Understand that double taxation policy includesprinciples (e.g.,
double taxation is harmful), norms (e.g., residence should yield
to source), and rules(e.g., details for coordinating the countries'
tax laws)-each of which plays a different role in 3the nature and
degree of conflict and agreement among states;1
2) Consider the impact of "power" as compared to game theory,
type of issue, and pairing of states in understanding regime
formation;
3) Examine the relationship between a game theory description
of
4
the regime process and the types of states involved;'
4) Contemplate the role played by nonstate actors in the regime
process. "
The application of regime theory to the double taxation case study serves as a
window into the possible relationship between international tax and
international relations theory. First, a regime theory approach can be used to
illuminate other issues currently under debate in the international tax arena,
including tax competition, transfer pricing, and arbitrage. Second, with
increased experience we may develop a better sense of what factors are likely
to contribute to regime formation in international tax, and what factors are
mostly likely to be problematic. Third, regime theory directs our attention to
the powerful impact ofnonstate actors including international organizations and
multinational corporations on the development of international tax policy and
practice.
Each of the above points emerging from regime theory work will benefit
from continued research and analysis within international tax. However,
regime theory is not international relations theory's only potential contribution
to international tax. Two other particularly important strands from international
relations theory include: 1) the role of sovereignty in regime formation and
failure, and 2) the impact of a state's domestic tax and political situation on its
international tax policy. Diane Ring and Allison Christians 6 are currently
examining taxation and sovereignty, and Steven Dean and Adam Rosenzweig
13.

InternationalTax Relations, supra 7, at 147.

14. The implications of game theory in international tax are considered below in Part IV by Adam
Rosenzweig.
15.

InternationalTax Relations, supra note 7, at 97, 147-48.

16. See Diane Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation
State, 1-5, 41-44 (2008) (working paper on file with author) andAlison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation,
and Social Contract,81 MINN. J. INT'L. L. (forthcoming, 2008) (on file with author).
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are pursuing the impact of domestic politics and group dynamics on international taxation, infraPart IV and Part V-all with the expectation that international tax will be enriched through this expanded scope of inquiry which
recognizes the powerful link between international tax and international
relations.
17
Ill. THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAx LAW

Professor Ring's work on regime theory in international taxation highlights
how important core international law concepts can be for understanding how
tax law is evolving in the United States and elsewhere. When ideas change
about the meaning and significance of concepts such as sovereignty-what it
is, and what it implies for those who make, implement, and try to abide by what
they consider to be law-the implications can be significant even if it is not
clear why or how the conceptions have changed and are changing. Admittedly,
a simple inquiry into the connection between taxation and sovereignty is not
particularly novel-a people's right to establish its own tax system, often
labeled "tax sovereignty," as classically described by Schumpeter, is a wellaccepted construct in tax scholarship. 8 Even so, many of the ideas we tax
scholars seem to hold about sovereignty have been fairly thin, and some of our
key assumptions seem to be undergoing major challenges and changes. It
seems clear that tax scholars could benefit from a more fully developed
scholarship on the nature of sovereignty as a constraint on law from a
theoretical, and philosophical, and instrumentalist perspective.
As is the case in many other regulatory policy areas, globalization has
brought transnational and international issues to the fore in domestic tax policy
debates. At issue is what states can or should do to regulate economic activity
in an age in which sovereign borders mean little for the flow of economic
activity yet potentially constrain the rule of law. To overcome the potential
constraints of national borders on the regulation of international activity,
domestic policymakers are increasingly using transnational networks, such as
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as
places to coordinate and forge consensus on tax practices and related regulatory
issues.19 In confronting the collective action problems posed by the
17.
Professor Christians explores these issues in detail in other works. See, e.g., Allison Christians,
HardLaw, Soft Law, and InternationalTaxation, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325 (2007) [hereinafter HardLaw];
Christians, supra note 16.
18.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisisof the Tax State, translatedin INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
PAPERS: TRANSLATION PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 5, 17-19 (Peacock,
Stolper, Turvey & Henderson, eds., 1954).
19.
The OECD is a thirty-member international organization that includes most of the world's
largest economies, including the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, but not including
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international tax regime, these policymakers are rethinking what sovereignty
does, can, and should mean in a globalized world.
A major example of this rethinking has emerged in the OECD's work on
curbing what they describe as harmful tax practices.20 In the relatively short
amount of time since the OECD began this initiative, a significant body of
scholarship has emerged to try to understand and explain what exactly the
OECD's role is, can, or should be in shaping domestic tax law.2' Substantively,
the OECD's work illustrates the difficulty of overcoming global collective
action problems in the absence of a multilateral agreement such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a forum for resolving disputes
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The OECD's work has
demonstrated that striving for coherency within any one tax system is becoming
an increasingly futile effort without achieving virtually global adherence to
some fundamentally global agreed-upon tax policy principles. But this
recognition uncovers major challenges for national policymakers, who must
determine both what justifies any given choice of principles and on what basis
one sovereign state can compel any other to adhere to any given choices.
Some form of framework is needed to debate the principles themselves as
well as the theoretical justification for their implementation. One such framework that seems worth exploring is found primarily in political philosophy and
international relations literature: that of defining and understanding the role of
a social contract in constraining the behavior of individual societies for the
benefit of the community of societies as a whole. Through its initiative, the
OECD is implicitly advancing the existence of a global social compact that
constrains states to regulate in a way that prioritizes community-wide fairness

China or India. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Ratificationof the
Convention on the OECD and OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_
2649201185_1889402_1_1

11,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). The OECD develops tax policy

guidance that both encapsulates and sets international tax standards in what are usually referred to as

"international" issue areas such as transfer pricing in multinational firms and cross-border income tax
coordination. It serves as a forum for consensus-building among interested parties rather than a body for
creating laws with which its members are expected to comply. As such, it operates more like a transnational
network than a supranational organization. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER 11-13, 145

(2004) (describing a transnational network as a horizontal network ofnational officials that builds consensus
among the members but may be "decentralized and dispersed, incapable of exercising centralized coercive
authority," and a supranational organization as a vertical network used by "states to delegate their sovereignty
to an institution above them with real [coercive] power ..
" Id. at 13). Nevertheless, many of the OECD's
declarations in tax matters may be accepted by some as largely equivalent to binding law. See Hard Law,
supra note 17.

20.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development http://www.oecd.org/department/

0,3355,en_2649_33745_11
21.

1 1,00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).

See HardLaw, supra note 17.
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in tax policy over competition among states. 22 This work suggests that interpreting the OECD's work on harmful tax competition as a forging, or defining,
of a social contract is one way to frame the issues for debate on both the
substantive merits (which rules, standards, and principles are being chosen) and
instrumental ones (how the goals are being developed, implemented, and
monitored).
This work argues that key players in the OECD are implicitly advancing
a theory that sovereign states, by virtue of their membership in international
society, are obligated to design their tax systems according to a set of fundamental principles agreed upon by the OECD. These policymakers are working
together to create consensus positions and disseminating these positions with
justificatory rhetoric regarding whether and how countries must cooperate in
tax policy formulation. Their main principle seems to be that nation states have
a duty to design their tax systems in ways that are responsive to global
community goals, even when these conflict with domestic goals.
This principle, and an evolving theory about sovereignty and a social
compact, emerges from the language developed by international experts and
officials over time to defend tax sovereignty while simultaneously advancing
universality in several key areas of tax policy. The rhetoric of those who shape
international tax policy gives us clues about what the rule makers, and those
who reflect on the rules, think is important and appropriate at any given time.
Using a social contract approach is one way to explore emerging ideas and
perceptions about what states owe each other, and to recognize that these ideas
and perceptions are constantly evolving. Searching for changes in thinking
about what tax sovereignty means within the language currently used by
international experts and policymakers is a starting point for addressing the
larger question of what sovereignty does or should entail for taxation in a
globalized world.
23
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

Making sense of the relationships that form the international tax regime
represents an enormous, perhaps insurmountable,2 4 challenge. As discussed

22.

Christians, supra note 16, at 44.

23.
Professor Dean has explored related themes in two prior articles. See Steven Dean, The
Incomplete Global Marketfor Tax Information, (Brook. Law School, Legal Studies, Paper No. 94, 2008)
[hereinafter Incomplete GlobalMarket], availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=-1078732 (last visited Mar. 22,
2008); Steven A. Dean, PhilosopherKings and InternationalTax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax
Flight,and InternationalTax Cooperation,58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007).
24.
It may even be worth asking whether any such system exists. See Rosenbloom, supranote 3,
at 27. "What, exactly, is this 'international tax system' that the Committee invoked? Is it real? Currently
functioning?" Id. at 137. Professor Ring's work, for example, demonstrates that we cannot hope to find
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above, one way to conceptualize those relationships is to picture states as
citizens of a global community committed to observing norms of behavior that
advance the collective interests of that community. The concept of state as
citizen invites a number of compelling questions. One is whether states are
"members of a close-knit group" of the type that can sustain the informal norms
that can create "Order without Law,, 25 so that the community's interests are
served despite the absence of a formal supra-national governance structure.26
A second is a question that international tax scholars have only begun to
confront. 27 The notion that individuals often act irrationally and counter to their
own best interests is well entrenched among legal scholars. The question
international tax scholars must grapple with is whether there is any reason to
expect better of our metaphorical citizen-states. Assuming that it is possible for
large groups of individuals to agree on the nature of their collective best
interests, 2' how likely are national governments to translate their rational
desires into coherent laws, treaties and policies? There are good reasons to
doubt the results that even well-intentioned legislators produce. 29 The link
between a nation's collective well-being and the actions of its government is
likely to be even more attenuated when the role of special interests and the
other foibles of the domestic political process are taken into account.
Still, accepting that domestic politics and the inherent limitations of
government play a significant role in determining the shape of the international
tax regime, this is not tantamount to rejecting the possibility that international
tax scholars can understand and even help to improve that regime. In fact, just
the opposite may be true. With the right tools, including the theoretical insights
offered by international law scholars,30 students of the international tax regime

answers unless we go beyond the traditional approach to tax scholarship into literatures that expressly try to
resolve such questions.
25.

ROBERTC. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTEs 167(1991).

26.

Such as that presented by the WTO.

27.
See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax
Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV 155 (2007) (considering why it might be rational for nations to pursue policies that
advance worldwide welfare).
28.
Are we strict utilitarians attempting to achieve the highest possible GDP? Rawlsians intent on
achieving a fair distribution of well-being? Radical environmentalists?
29.
"Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" does not offer much reason for optimism on this front. "In
1972, Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel Prize in large part for proving mathematically that no legislative process
can simultaneously satisfy ... five assumptions on legislative fairness ... and remain rational, where
rationality is defined as the capability of aggregating individual preferences into transitive group orderings."
Maxwell L. Steams, The MisguidedRenaissanceof Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1224 (1994).
30.
Oona A. Hathaway, Between PowerandPrinciple:An IntegratedTheory ofInternationalLaw,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 514-19 (2005) (creating a comprehensive framework for predicting the likelihood
that nations will commit to and comply with international regimes).
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may be in a position to answer questions that would otherwise defy rational
explanation. For example, domestic political considerations might explain why
existing bilateral tax treaties do a good job of ensuring that taxpayers are not
subject to duplicative taxes, but do little to help extend the administrative reach
of national tax authorities beyond national boundaries (even if both would
increase the treaty partners' economic welfare).31 Expanding the focus of
international tax scholarship to consider these themes, along with the others
described in this essay, would help to provide policymakers with both a more
accurate snapshot of the international tax regime and a greater capacity to shape
its development.

V. GROUP DYNAMICS, GAME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL

TAX32

As with those issues discussed above, applying game theory to the
international relations of states and to the tax relations of states specifically, is
not new.33 Further, the recognition in the realm of international relations and
international law that states rarely fit the traditional unitary actor model is not
novel either; public choice theory, among others, provides alternative and, at
times, persuasive arguments to explain the rise of particular state policies. 34 As
the unitary actor model of the state becomes increasingly challenged outside of
international tax scholarship,35 the assumption of the state as a unitary actor in
game theoretical approaches to international tax grows decreasingly persuasive.
Correspondingly, the predictions to be made from a particular model using the
state as a unitary actor may not necessarily conform to reality, even if the game
has a persuasive explanatory effect.
Introducing group dynamics into game theory, or incorporating group and
sub-group dynamics into the models, may provide an avenue with which to
understand this disconnection.3 6 International law and international relations
theorists have begun to incorporate these multi-layered group dynamics into
their models of how societies, through groups, governments or otherwise, and

31.
See Incomplete Global Market, supra note 23 (discussing the differing fortunes of the early
League of Nations anti-double tax and administrative assistance treaties).
32.
Professor Rosenzweig has focused on these issues in previous work, See Adam Rosenzweig,
Harnessingthe Costs of InternationalTax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555 (2007).
33.

InternationalTax Relations, supra note 7, at 136-137.

34.
See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic InstitutionalTheory of InternationalLaw, 51 BUFF.
L. REv. 679 (2003).
35.
See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, The Decline of the Nation State and its
Effects on Constitutionaland InternationalEconomic Law: A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperationand the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDoZO L. REV. 925 (1996).
36.
See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of
Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1281 (2003).
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states interact with each other.37 What is emerging from this work is that
private actors interacting with each other across borders can impact not only
how any one state interacts with other states, but also how such private actors
interact with each other within their own borders.3" As groups of private actors
internalize norms through such interactions across borders, their influence on
the policies of their particular state may change as well. In other words, it is the
increasing globalization of people, goods, and capital itself which may be
changing the terms of the game by transforming both the internal and external
incentives of countries and their citizens.
This is a potentially powerful conclusion for the field of international tax
law. As people, goods, and capital increasingly cross state borders, and as more
states are brought into the international tax discussion, it may be necessary to
more directly confront the possibility that group dynamics are changing the way
to conceptualize a game theoretical model of international tax. Doing so would
not only provide further support to the existing explanatory game theory models
of international tax, but could also significantly increase their predictive power
as well. Taken to its logical, but not necessarily inevitable conclusion, focusing
the international tax laws on these group dynamics could itself change the
group dynamics, potentially leading to a more optimal worldwide tax system.39
This is not to say that game theory is a panacea for international tax
cooperation. The literature is littered with the remains of theories claiming
such authority in the past. It may, however, have more relevance if broader
global socio-legal interactions are incorporated into the models, so as to more
closely tailor their explanatory power with the reality seen in the modern world.

37. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive InternationalLaw,
60 VAND. L. REv. 77 (2007); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-nternationalNorms, Signals, and
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and the Law, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71 (2003); see also Brent Simpson, Social Values, Subjective
Transformations,and Cooperationin SocialDilemmas,67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 385 (2004); Peter Kollock, Social
Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation,24 ANN. REv. SOC. 183 (1998).
38. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 37, at 71 ("This set of dynamics-which I propose to refer to as
the 'logic ofreciprocity'-suggests not only an alternative account of when collective-action problems will
arise, but also an alternative program for solving (or simply avoiding) them through law."); Whitehead, supra
note 37, at 696 ("The unitary model, consequently, understates the impact on compliance of informal
pressures at the small group and individual levels, and of potentially competing interests between domestic
and international state representatives."); Simpson, supra note 37, at 386 ("it follows that a tendency for
actors to transform [Prisoners Dilemma] into [an Assurance Game] would have important implications for
how groups solve social dilemmas.").
39.
Geisinger & Stein, supra note 37, at 112 ("When norms are uncertain, the process of
international law making can serve to construct normative beliefs.").
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VI. CONCLUSION

Contemporary tax scholars face a daunting task in redefining the contours
of a rich body of literature created by generations of professors, practitioners,
and policymakers to reflect a swiftly evolving international environment.
Fortunately, the work of international law scholars, among others, offers
insights that make that task much more manageable. The four lines of inquiry
we have outlined here represent just a few ways to approach the complex web
of interrelated issues that make up the global social, economic, and legal
landscape in which taxation plays a role. Each is part of a search for more
comprehensive analytical tools to assess tax policy decisions that are being
made by national, subnational, and transnational bodies. As the line between
national and international blurs in taxation, as it has in other regulatory fields,
tax scholarship can benefit from the analytical work being done by others who
have grappled with the role and reach of international actors, institutions,
organizations, and frameworks. We hope that this essay furthers this kind of
study.

